This paper explores the roles of internal and external habit formation in a simple model of endogenous growth with overlapping generations. Unlike the representative agent settings in which the distinction between internal and external habits may not yield significant qualitative differences in working of the model economy, our study shows that the internal and external habit persistence in an overlapping generations economy may have qualitatively different effects on the steady-state characterization as well as on the dynamic behavior of the economy. We also confirm that in an overlapping generations framework, whether the habits in the utility function takes subtractive or multiplicative forms may be critical both for long-run growth and for transitional dynamics.
Introduction
When discussing habit persistence of consumption, the literature has distinguished internal (inward-looking) habits from external (outward-looking) habits. The internal habit formation means that the current level of utility is affected by the accumulated stock of past private consumption. Since in this situation the future felicity depends on the choice of current consumption, a rational consumer takes this fact into account in selecting her optimal consumption plan. In contrast, in the presence of external habit formation, the accumulated level of aggregate (or average) past consumption in the economy at large affects the current utility of an individual consumer. External habit formation is a form of intertemporal consumption externalities, so that the consumer does not internalize external habits when making her optimal decision.
Using the representative agent models, several authors have examined implications of the distinction between internal and external habit persistence. A sample of this literature includes Weil (1997, 2000) and Harbaugh (1996) on the relation between savings and long-run growth, Gomez (2008) on the speed of convergence, Grishchenko (2007) on asset pricing, and Uribe (2002) on exchange rate determination. Although those studies demonstrate that whether habit formation is internal or external to the consumers may yield significant quantitative differences, it may not change working of a model economy in fundamental ways: the dynamic behavior and steady-state characterization of a model with internal habit persistence are generally the same as those of a models with external habit formation. The main reason for this result is that in representative-agent models the average consumption habit stock of the entire economy equals the private habit stock in equilibrium. Therefore, the internal habit stock always takes the same level as the external habit stock. Such a restriction may contribute to reducing qualitative differences between outcomes generated by external and internal habit formation.
Unlike most of the foregoing studies, in this paper we examine the effects of internal and external habits in the context of an overlapping generations (OLG) economy. In an OLG economy there are heterogenous cohorts in each period and, hence, the habit stock of consumers in each cohort is no more equal to the average habit stock of the economy. In addition, the presence of heterogenous agents makes intertemporal consumption externalities more complex than those in the representative-agent economies. Those facts suggest that there may exist significant differences between the roles of internal and external habit formation in an OLG economy. In order to confirm this prediction, we construct a simple growth model with overlapping generations where both internal and external consumption habits are present. As for internal habits, we employ the standard formulation in which the level of consumption in young age affects the consumer's felicity when old. In formulating external habit formation, we follow de la Croix (1996) and de la Croix and Michel (1999) who assume that young agents' consumption behavior is affected by their parents' consumption levels.
Such an 'inherited taste' represents intergenerational external effects in consumption, which is a natural expression of external habit formation in an OLG economy.
In this paper we utilize an endogenous growth version of Diamond's (1965) model and introduce two types of habits mentioned above into the base model. Inspecting the model behavior, we obtain two main findings. First, as was predicted, the steady state characterization and dynamic stability of the economy is highly sensitive to whether habit persistence is internal or external to the agents. In particular, in the presence of external habits persistence, the internal habit formation in consumption may yield more complex effects than in the representative agent economies. Furthermore, stability of the balanced growth path depends heavily upon the strength of habit persistence and the growth effects of internal habit formation depends on the strength of external habits. Second, the dynamic behavior and balanced growth equilibrium are also affected by the way how consumption habit stocks are introduced into the felicity function. To see this, we use two of the most popular formulations used in the literature: subtractive and multiplicative forms. If habit formation has a subtractive form in the utility, we generally obtain straightforward conclusions. In contrast, the formulation of multiplicative habits yields rather complex results and many of the outcomes depends on whether the agents are conformists or anti-conformists. As well as the distinction between internal and external habits, in the representative agent economies, the analytical outcomes of subtractive and multiplicative habit formation yields quantitative effects alone. Our study thus demonstrates that the way how consumption habit formation is formulated plays a more prominent role in an OLG economy than in the representative agent counterpart.
It is to be pointed out that our study is most closely related to Carroll et al. (1997 and 2000) and Alonso-Carrera et al. (2007) . Carroll et al. (1997 and 2000) examine representative agent models of endogenous growth with an Ak technology. They compare the model with internal habits with one with external habits. As mentioned above, they conclude that while the distinction between internal and external habit formation may produce relevant quantitative differences, the equilibrium dynamics and steady state of the model economy do not affected by that distinction. Our discussion clarifies that those conclusions do not necessarily hold in overlapping generations settings. Alonso-Carrera et al. not overlap those existing studies. Therefore, the present paper is a compliment rather than a substitute to the foregoing contributions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section sets up the base model. Section 3 examines a model with subtractive habit formation, while Section 4 reconsiders the base model in the case of multiplicative habits. In both sections, we focus on the properties of balanced growth equilibrium and equilibrium dynamics out of the balanced growth path. Section 5 concludes.
Analytical Framework

Preferences
Consider an overlapping generations economy where there are three types of agents, young, adult and old. When young, the agents neither consume nor work. They only observe their parents' (i.e. adult agents') consumption behavior and 'inherit' their tastes. During adult period, the agents work, consume and save. At the same time, they again observe consumption behaviors of their parents (i.e. old agents) and inherit them. When old, the agents only consume. Population is constant and each cohort consists of a continuum of identical agents with a unit mass. In the following, the t-th generation means the cohort born at the beginning of period t − 1.
The life-time utility function of an agent in the t-th generation is given by
where c t denotes consumption when adult, x t+1 is consumption when old, and β is a given discount factor. Here, h t and h t+1 represent stocks of consumption habits in period t and t + 1, respectively. For analytical clarity, the following discussion employs specific forms of utility functions. More specifically, we consider alternative forms of popular specifications:
subtractive habits and multiplicative habits. When assuming the preference structure with a subtractive form of habit formation, we use the following function:
Ever since Ryder and Heal (1973) , this form of utility function including habits persistence has been frequently employed in the literature. Similarly, the multiplicative habits are formulated as
We compare the effects of internal and external habit formations by use of alternative functional forms given by (2) and (3) . 1
In general, h t depends c t−1 alone and h t+1 is determined by c t and x t . Since we have assumed that young agents do not consume, the stock of consumption habits held by the adult agents does not involve their past consumption. Thus the habit stock held by the adult agent is inherited by their parents' consumption in period t − 1:
We assume that the habit stock held when old, h t+1 , increases with c t and x t :
Namely, the habit stock held in the old period consists of the old-age consumption of their parents as well as their own consumption in the previous period. 2 In what follows, when we deal with the subtractive habit persistence, we specify h (c t , x t ) in such a way that
When we discuss the model with multiplicative habit, we use
It is to be noted that, as we will see in Section 4, if σ is less than one, then the felicity function with (7) is not strictly concave in c t and x t+1 so that it does not yield an interior solution for the household's selection of optimal consumption. To avoid obtaining this result, we use a linear function similar to (6) when we consider the case of multiplicative habits when 0 < σ < 1.
To sum up, external habits are expressed by c t−1 in (4) and x t , in (5), which also represent intertemporal consumption externalities. In contrast, c t in (5) means the internal habit formation perceived by the adult agents when deciding their optimal consumption-saving plan. 3 2 More generally, we may assume that h t+1 also depends on the average consumption in the economy at large when agents are young, that is, h t+1 = h (c t ,c t , x t ) , wherec t denotes the average consumption when young. In this formulation,c t expresses the intertemporal as well as intragenerational consumption externalities. Since introduction ofc t effect adds a purely quantitative effects on the model behavior, the following discussion does not considerc t . 3 In this paper we focus on intertemporal consumption externalities from parents to children. If we consider intratemporal external effects as well, the utility function may be set as
where et and et+1 represent intratemporal consumption external effects determined by
Here, a variable with an upper bar means the average level of that variable. This formulation states that the felicity of an agent is also affected by the current level of average consumption in the economy at large.
Note that in this formulation the felicity of an old agent depends on the average consumption of the next generation,c t+1 , which may change the dynamic properties of the model economy: see Mino (2007 and for dynamic analyses of OLG models with intratemporal consumption externalities.
Consumption and Saving
An adult agent supplies one unit of labor inelastically and spends its wage income for consumption and saving. In the old age, the agent consumes all of her saving. Thus the flow budget constraints for adult and old agents are respectively given by
where w t , s t and R t+1 denote real wage in period t, saving of the adult and the gross rate of return to capital in period t + 1, respectively. Combining these flow constraints, we obtain the life-time budget constraint:
In the beginning of period t, an agent in cohort born in period t − 1 maximizes U t given by (1) subject to (10) , (4) and (5) . Considering that c t−1 and x t are external to the t-th generation, we manipulate the first-order conditions for an optimum to obtain the following:
In the presence of internal habit formation, a substitution between consumption when adult, c t , and consumption when old, x t+1 , has two effects. One is the direct intertemporal substitution between current and future consumption, which is represented by the first term in the left hand side of (11) . Additionally, a change in the current consumption, c t . alters the level of habit stock in the old age, which affects the felicity when old. The second term in the left hand side of (11) expresses such an indirect substitution effect caused by the presence of inward-looking consumption habit. The optimal choice between c t and x t+1 thus requires that the sum of the direct and indirect rates of substitution equals the discounted rate of interest in period t + 1. Alternatively, we may rewrite (11) as
As formulated in (2) and (3) , the standard formulation of internal habits assumes that u 2 (x, h) < 0. One unite decrease in the current consumption, c t , increases one unit of saving, which yields the real interest, R t+1 , plus the return to a reduction in the internal consumption habit stock held in the next period represented by −[u 2 (.) (∂h t+1 /∂c t )]/u 1 (.) (> 0) .Thus (12) states that the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution in consumption equals the discounted subjective rate of return to investment that includes a change in the stock of internal consumption habits.
Finally, since only young agents work, capital accumulation is determined by the following condition:
Production
To avoid unnecessary complexity, we use the simplest model of endogenous growth. The production function is given by
where y t is aggregate output, k t is capital and N t denotes the total labor supply. In addition, k t expresses production externalities generated by capital stock in the sense of Romer (1986) .
Because of normalization of the number of young agents, we may set N t = 1 for all t. In additionk t = k t in equilibrium. Therefore, the social production function is written as
If capital depreciates at the rate of δ ∈ [0, 1] , the gross rate of return, R t , equals 1 + ∂Y t /∂k t − δ.We assume that capital completely depreciates within a period (δ = 1) , so that R t is given by
implying that the gross rate of return to capital stays constant over time. 4 Similarly, the real wage rate equals the private marginal productivity of labor, and hence
Because of an Ak structure of production, the economy can sustain persistent growth. 5 4 Since one period may be 25 or 30 years in a two-period lived OLG economy, the complete depreciation of capital is an plausible assumption. 5 An alternative implication of the Ak modelling is that the production inputs consist of physical and human
Subtractive Habits
We first consider the model with a subtractive form of habit formation. Substituting (4) and (6) into (2) , we obtain the following utility function:
Here, θ 0 and θ 1 represents the strength of taste inheritance, while η expresses the degree of internal habit persistence in the old age.
Dynamic System
Given (17) , the optimal condition (11) is expressed as
Using (9) and (13) , we obtain x t+1 = R t+1 k t+1 . Thus from (15) , it holds that
In view of (15) and (19) , the optimization condition (18) can be written as
where
In addition, equations (13) and (16) yield:
capitals:
where h t denotes stock of human capital. Suppose that both types of capital stocks are produced by use of final goods. Then the non-arbitrage condition between holding physical and human capital is given by
Substituting this into the production function, we obtain
Since this formulation does not assume the presence of external increasing returns, unlike the Romer-type modelling, there is no inefficiency in production. Otherwise, both formulations give essentially the same results.
Now define
By use of the above equation, we find that (20) gives the following difference equation of z t :
Since this equation contains all the equilibrium and optimization conditions, it gives a complete dynamic system of our economy.
Balanced-Growth Equilibrium and Stability
In the steady-state equilibrium, x t , c t and k t grow at a common rate. As a result,
stays constant over time. Letting z * be the steady-state value of z t , from (23) we see that z * satisfies
, which gives
To ensure the existence of z * , we assume that
Inspecting (23) and the steady state condition shown above, we may summarize the steady-state characterization in the case of subtractive habits in the following manner:
Proposition 1 In the model with subtractive habit formation, (i) if
there exist dual balanced-growth paths: one with a higher growth rate is locally stable and the other with a lower growth rate is locally unstable, and; (ii) if A(1 − α) < θ 1 , then the balanced growth path is uniquely given and it is globally unstable.
Proof. Let us write (23) as
where G (z t+1 ) is the right hand side of (23) . Note that
In addition, it is easy to see that if
Hence, G (z t+1 ) is monotonically increasing and strictly convex in z t+1 so that there are two
) is a monotonic function, the dynamic equation can be expressed as
Moreover, as Figure 1 -a shows, we see that
is strictly larger (resp. smaller) than 1, when z * has a relatively small (resp. large) value.
Since the initial value of z t = k t /c t−1 is historically given in the beginning of period t, the above shows that the steady state with a higher z * is locally stable, while the steady state with a lower z * is locally unstable. In the case that A (1 − α) < θ 1 , function is G 00 (z t+1 ) < 0 so that it is strictly concave, implying that the steady state with a positive z * is uniquely given. Since
dz t¯z t=z * = 1/G 0 (z * ) < 1 holds in this case, the unique balanced-growth path is globally unstable: see Figure 1 -b. Finally, notice that that (14) and (21) give y t+1 /y t = k t+1 /k t = (1−α)A−c t /k t . Therefore, the gross growth rate of income on the balanced-growth path is given by
This equation shows that the balanced growth rate, g * , increases with the steady state level of z * . Hence, the balanced growth path with a higher value of z * may attain a higher growth of income and capital.
In what follows, we focus on the stable balanced growth path obtained under the condition of A (1 − α) > θ 1 . More specifically, we examine how the strength of consumption habits affects the long-term growth rate of the economy. Since the balanced-growth rate of income monotonically increases with the steady state value of z t , we may consider the relation between external and internal habit formation and long-term growth by exploring the effects of changes in parameters, θ 0 , θ 1 and η on z * . Remember that when A (1 − α) > θ 1 , the steady state satisfying local stability is one with a higher level of z * . Hence, from (24) we focus on
In view of definitions of ξ, κ and φ, it is easy to see that
Since the balanced-growth rate of capital and income is positively related to z * , the above results show that a higher degree of taste inheritance in the adult age decelerates growth, while a stronger degree of aspiration for their parents' consumption in the old age accelerates capital formation. Note that a higher aspiration for parents' consumption ('caching-up with their parents') in adult age raises the marginal utility in that period, so that the adult agents increase their consumption level relative to that in their old age. As a result, savings are reduced and thus capital accumulation is decelerated. In contrast, a rise in the degree of external effect in old age increases the marginal utility of consumption when old. Thus the agent substitute consumption in their adult age with that in their old age, so that saving will increase to yield a higher balanced-growth rate of income.
The effects of a change in the intensity of internal habit formation, η, are more complex than those of θ 0 and θ 1 . We find that the sign of ∂z * /∂η depends on the magnitudes of parameter values involved in the model: see the numerical examples given in the Appendix to the paper. To sum up, we have found:
Proposition 2 On the balanced-growth path satisfying local stability, a higher degree of external habit persistence in the adult age lowers the balanced growth rate, while stronger external habit persistence when old enhances long-term growth. Whether a rise in the intensity of internal habit persistence may have a growth enhancing effect depends on the magnitudes of other parameters.
We may obtain more precise interpretation of the comparative statics results in the above proposition. To do so, first note that in our setting (12) is expressed as µĉ
whereĉ t = c t −θ 0 c t−1 andx t+1 = x t+1 −θ 1 x t −ηc t . This equation states that the marginal rate of substitution between habit adjusted consumption in adult and old ages equal the discounted rate of return to capital plus the degree of internal habit persistence. Note that changes in the strength of external habits, θ 0 and θ 1 , do not alter the marginal rate of substitution of habit adjusted consumption, (ĉ t /x t+1 ) −σ . Hence, if θ 0 increases under given levels of c t−1 and x t , both c t and x t+1 increase to keep (ĉ t /x t+1 ) −σ constant. As a result, consumption in both adult and old age rise, so that capital accumulation will decease. When θ 1 rises under a given level of x t , the consumption when adult, c t will decline to keep (ĉ t /x t+1 ) −σ constant, which means that the saving of adult agents increases and capital accumulation is accelerated.
If the degree of internal habit increases, there are two outcomes. First, the habit-adjusted discounted rate of return, β (αA + η) , rises and thus (ĉ t /x t+1 ) −σ increases. Hence, the habitadjusted consumption in the adult age is substituted with that in the old age. This means that consumption when adult, c t , will decline, so that saving will increase. At the same time, consumption when old, x t+1 , may increase as well to meet the change in the intertemporal rate of substitution. If the first effect dominate the second, the aggregate saving in each period rises, leading to a higher long run growth of income. However, when the second effect dominates the first, the overall effect of a rise in η may reduce the balanced-growth rate of income.
Notice that if there is no internal habit persistence (η = 0) , then z * = 0 or z * = ξ/κ, so that the feasible steady state with a positive value of z * is uniquely given. Except for this result, the steady state characterization is essentially the same as that in the presence of internal habit formation. Thus the internal habits mainly generate quantitative effects rather than qualitative effects on the balanced-growth path.
In contrast, if there is only internal habit formation (η and θ 0 = θ 1 = 0) , then dynamic equation (20) is replaced with αAk t+1 − (η + φ)c t = 0, which is rewritten as
where g t = k t+1 /k t . Combining (21) and (29), we see that the gross growth rate of capital is
In this case, the predetermined variable at the beginning of period t is k t alone, the initial value of g t (= k t+1 /k t ) is not fixed. Therefore, the economy without external habits may always stay on the balanced growth path. As (30) shows, a rise η increases g t , so that a stronger internal habit persistence produces a higher income growth if there is no external habit formation. Thus we have found:
Proposition 3 In the case of subtractive habit formation, there exists a unique and stable balanced growth path if there is external habit persistence alone. If there is only internal habit formation, then the economy always stays on a unique balanced-growth path and a stronger habit persistence increases the balanced-growth rate of the economy.
Multiplicative Habits
In this section we assume that habit stocks are involved in the felicity function as multiplicative form of (3) . We first assume that the utility function is given by
In the above, θ and γ − θ respectively denote the degrees of external habits in adult and old ages, while γ represents the intensity of internal habit formation in the old age. Since we will focus on the balanced-growth equilibrium in which c t and x t grow at a constant rate, the felicity in each period should have the same degree of homogeneity. To satisfy this requirement, we assume that habit persistence in the old age, c −γ
, is homogenous of degree θ in c t and x t to keep the homogeneity of U t function. In addition, we assume that σ > 1 in order to obtain an interior solution for the household's optimization problem. When we consider the case of 0 < σ < 1 in Section 4.3, we will use an alternative functional form.
Dynamic System
The representative agent in cohort born in period t − 1 chooses c t ,and x t+1 to maximize the utility (31) subject to (10) . The first-order condition is given by:
Note that c t /c t−1 = (c t /k t ) (k t /c t+1 ) . Thus by use of (19) and (22) , we transform (32) into
which leads to
Dynamic equation (33) presents a complete dynamic system that summarizes the equilibrium dynamics of the model with multiplicative habit formation.
Balanced-Growth Equilibrium and Stability
Inspecting dynamic equation (33) , we first find the following result:
Proposition 4 If the utility function is given by (31) in the case of multiplicative habits, then there is a unique balanced-growth equilibrium. In addition, the balanced-growth path satisfies global stability,if and only if
Proof. Let us rewrite (33) as
The steady-state value of z t fulfilling z * = F (z * ) is given by
Given our assumption that σ > 1, the left hand side of the above is monotonically decreasing and it takes +∞ when z * = 0, while it is zero when z * = +∞. Similarly, the right hand side of the above is strictly increasing and it is zero when z * = 0 increasing and strictly concave in z, and it is zero when z * = 0. The right hand side is a monotonically decreasing function of z with a positive intercept. Thus it is easy to see that there is a unique, positive value of z that fulfills (35) . To check stability of the balanced growth path, notice that F (0) = 0 and that
In addition, we see that F (0) = 0 and lim z t+1 →∞ F (z t+1 ) = +∞ for σ > 1. As a consequence,
then z * = F (z * ) has a unique, positive solution. If this is the case, as Figure 2 shows, it
Consequently, the balanced-growth path with a positive z * satisfies global stability.
We also confirm that in the case of σ > 1, if θ increases, the steady-state value of z * satisfying (35) rises. In addition, it is also seen that the effect of a change in γ on z * is ambiguous (see numerical examples in the Appendix). Thus we have found:
Proposition 5 If the utility function is given by (31) , a higher degree of external habit formation enhances long run growth, while the growth effect of a rise in the strength of internal habit persistence depends on the parameter values involved in the model economy.
It is to be noted that unlike the subtractive form of habit persistence discussed in the previous section, we have imposed restrictions on the parameter specification to sustain the balanced-growth equilibrium. Therefore, a rise in θ increases the external effect of consumption in the adult as well as in the old age. Similarly, a change in γ affects the degrees of strength of internal and external habit persistence in the old age at the same time. In section 4.3 we use an alternative functional form of utility function that can treat those effects separately.
As well as in the case of subtractive habit formation, (12) is written as µx
whereĉ t = c t c
respectively denote the habit-adjusted consumption in the adult and old ages. A key difference between (28) and (36) is that in the case of multiplicative habits the effect of a unit of change in the habit stock, γx t+1 /c t , is not constant over time. Furthermore, the level of relative habit stocks, h t /h t+1 , also affects the optimal selection ofĉ t andx t+1 . The qualitative as well as quantitative divergence in outcomes between the subtractive and multiplicative formulations of habit persistence mainly comes from those differences in the first-order condition.
Two special cases deserve to be mentioned. First, suppose that there is no external habit formation in the adult age (θ = 0) . Then (34) becomes
This system contains only z t+1 = k t+1 /c t . Since the value of c t is not specified at the beginning of t, the economy, again, always stays on the balanced-growth path. In view of the definition
of Ω, we find that the steady state level of z is determined by
.
It is easy to see that, given our assumption that σ > 1, a rise in γ raises z * satisfying the above equation. Therefore, as well as in the case of subtractive habits, a larger internal habit persistence enhances long-term growth if there is no external habit formation.
Next, assume that there is no internal habit formation, so that γ = 0. In this case we can consider the case of 0 < σ < 1, because the household's optimization problem involves an interior solution for all σ > 0 if there is no internal habit persistence. When γ = 0, the steady-state value of z is explicitly given by
so that the balanced-growth path is uniquely determine. The dynamic equation for this case is reduced to
Inspecting (37), we find the following. When σ > 1, it is easy to see that function N (z t+1 ) defined in (37) is monotonically increasing and strictly convex function of z t : see Figure 3 -a.
Therefore, the unique balanced growth equilibrium satisfies global stability. An increase in the degree of external effect, θ, shifts down the graph of N (z t+1 ) , so that the steady state value of z t increases. Since there is positive relation between the steady state levels of z t and the balanced-growth rare of income, a higher θ raises the balanced-growth rate. In contrast, if σ < 1, as depicted by Figure 3 Noting that in the steady state it holds that
Consequently, the dynamics system exhibits local stability around the balanced growth equi-
Otherwise, the dynamic system is locally unstable. As shown above, the balanced growth path is uniquely determined, the economy satisfies global stability if (38) is met. As a result, if θ/ (1 + θ) < σ < 1, then the economy cyclically converges to the balanced growth path.
We may summarize the above argument as the following proposition:
Proposition 6 If consumption habit formation takes a multiplicative form and if there is no internal habit persistence, then the balanced-growth path is uniquely given and it is globally stable if and only if θ 1 + θ < σ.
In addition, σ > 1, a higher degree of external habit formation, θ, raises the balanced growth rate, while it lowers the balanced growth rate if θ/ (1 + θ) < σ < 1.
To interpret these results, notice the following facts:
Thus if σ > 1, the marginal utility of private consumption increases with her parent's consumption levels, that is, the agents are conformists in the sense that she likes being similar to their parents consumption behaviors (keeping up with their parents). In contrast, if σ < 1, then the marginal utility of private consumption decreases with c t−1 and x t so that the agents 
An Alternative Specification
So far, we have assumed that if there is internal consumption persistence, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in felicity, 1/σ, should be less than unity to yield an interior solution for the agents' optimization problem. To consider the case of 1/σ > 1, we now use the following utility function:
It is easy to see that as long as ε > 0, this function may yield an interior optimum solution for the household's consumption plan even for the case that 0 < σ < 1. µĉ
Given (??) , the first-order condition for an optimum can be summarized as
Using z t = k t /c t−1 , x t = αAk t and c t /k t = (1 − α) A/ (1 + z t+1 ) , we can rewrite (40) in the following way:
Noting that c t /c t−1 = z t (c t /k t ), we find that the above equation gives
The steady-state level of z t satisfies z = H (z) . Since H (.) function is rather complex, it is more convenient to express the steady state condition, z = H (z) , for the case of σ > 1 in the following manner:
When σ > 1, we see that I (0) = +∞ and I (+∞) = 0 as well as
In addition, both I (z) and J (z) monotonically decreases with z. As a consequence, the relation between those two functions may be depicted as Figures 4-a showing that there is at least one steady state value of z. It is also seen that a rise in the degree of internal habits, γ, respectively shifts the graphs of I (z) up and that of J (z) down. Therefore, a higher degree of internal habits raises the steady state value of z and, hence, the balanced growth rate will increase as long as the balanced growth path is stable.
If 0 < σ < 1, then it is useful to express the steady state condition as
The both sides of the above monotonically increases with z and it holds that
Again, as Figure 5 shows, there is at least one steady state level of z. Since in this case a rise in γ may shifts down or up the graph of L (z) , its effect on the long-term growth depends on the parameter values.
This example indicates that in the presence of both internal and external habit persistence, not only the growth effect of outward-looking habit formation but also the growth effect of inward-looking habits may critically depend on whether the agents are conformists
Conclusion
This paper has examined how the presence of internal as well as external habit formation affects long-run equilibrium and dynamic behavior of an overlapping generations economy with endogenous growth. We have shown that if there is only external habit formation, which represents taste inheritance from parents to children, then it plays the role similar to that in the representative agent economies. Namely, in the presence of envy (aspiration) and conformism, external habit formation may promote long-run growth, while anti-conformism would reduce the long-term growth rate of income. In contrast, internal habit formation in an overlapping generations model with endogenous growth presents more complex effects on the dynamic behavior as well as the steady state characteristic of the economy. Therefore, when the consumers have both types habits persistence, the distinction between external and internal habit persistence would be more relevant in OLG economies than in the representative agent counterpart where both types of habits generally yield the same type of impact on the economy. Additionally, we have confirmed that the dynamic behavior and steady-state conditions of an OLG economy is highly sensitive to whether habit stocks are introduced into the felicity function in subtractive or multiplicative form. Since functional forms of habit formation generally yields quantitative effects alone in the representative-agent models, our findings have demonstrated that the how the preference structure is formulated would be critical in examining overlapping generations economies with habit persistence in consumption.
In this paper we have focused on the issue how the alternative formulations of habit persistence of consumption may yield different outcomes in an endogenously growing economy.
Our next task is to investigate policy implications in growing OLG economies in the presence of alternative forms of habit formation.
Appendix
In this appendix we present some numerical examples of dynamic equations. Figure A1 depicts the graph of z t = G (z t+1 ) in Proposition 1 for the case of subtractive habits. This example set the baseline parameter values as follows:
Following the standard specification, the income share of capital, α, is assumed to be 1/3.
Since in our three-period lived OLG model, one period may be considered 25 years, so that the discount factor β is set at 0.5, which means that the annual discount factor is about 0.9726 ³ ' (0.5) 1/25´. Since the elasticity of substitution in consumption does not play a relevant role in the model with subtractive habits, we fix σ at 1.2. 
